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Additional details can be accessed on the Symposium website: [https://china-symposium.yale.edu/](https://china-symposium.yale.edu/)

We extend our sincere gratitude to the sponsors of the 2019 Symposium: Council on East Asian Studies; F&ES Community Events Fund; Nature & Society Learning Community at F&ES; Council on Southeast Asian Studies; Council on Latin American & Iberian Studies; Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School; Yale Center for Business & the Environment; and the Energy Learning Community at F&ES.

This report aims to represent the diversity of thoughts and ideas exchanged during the Symposium, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the organizers.
Preface

The 3rd Yale Symposium on Chinese Overseas Investment Impacts took place in January 2019. Following a turbulent year of geopolitical shifts, particularly in countries along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), international media narratives emphasized the “debt trap” of host countries being indebted to Chinese state-owned banks, or conflicts between Chinese workers and locals. Yet these kinds stories neglect one of the most significant aspects of the BRI—its environmental impacts. China’s BRI comes at a pivotal moment in history, where we are faced with inextricable challenges of climate change and sustainable development.

At the global scale, in terms of increasing emissions that exacerbate climate change and at the local level, where forests and grasslands give way to railroads and industrial zones, the BRI will result in massive environmental changes. Whether those changes will lead to further environmental degradation and climate instability or establish foundations of genuinely sustainable development will be determined by the next steps taken by developers and planners of the BRI. As such, the theme for this year’s Symposium was “Greening the Belt and Road.” Experts from diverse organizations and institutions came together to share their knowledge and experiences from the fields of policy, advocacy, law, and academia, moving towards the common goal of better understanding how to ensure that the BRI will be both environmentally sustainable and socially equitable.

There is no doubt that such a massive undertaking, carried out by engineers, construction workers, policymakers, and development experts, will lead to major transformations in local economies and ecologies around the world. We see this moment as a critical juncture in which the Chinese government and its partners can avoid repeating the mistakes of previous development schemes and move beyond the “pollute first, clean up later” mentality of industrialization. The voices gathered at the Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies covered the historical, legal, and technical dimensions of the BRI, as well as in-depth case studies of Chinese investments across the world.

Our hope is that this brief summary of fascinating discussions and insights will inspire further exploration of this important topic. There are many angles to approach China’s global environmental impacts through the Belt and Road Initiative—from the micro to the macro, it is necessary to understand the radical transformations that are taking place in countries as far apart as Nepal and Gabon. Landscapes and communities from the Amazon to the Mekong are being transformed by Chinese development finance. It is imperative that a broad coalition of scholars, researchers, and advocates work together with local communities and civil society, as well as corporations and governments, to ensure that development is not only sustainable, but just and equitable.
Introducing China’s Belt and Road Initiative

In 2013, President Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which form the Belt and Road Initiative. By investing over US $1 trillion in energy and transportation infrastructure, this Chinese-led, multilateral development plan links together overland economic corridors and seaborne trade routes from Asia to Africa, Europe, and Latin America. If fully realized, the BRI, which encompasses two thirds of the world’s landmass, will impact more than half of the world’s population. Over 70 countries have formally joined the BRI, while over 120 countries have signed cooperation agreements with China. The geographic scope of Belt and Road Initiative can be interpreted as an expression of China’s great power status—yet this narrative of China being the center of world trade is not new. Since the Tang dynasty, the transcontinental trade routes now known as the Silk Roads have facilitated the flow of people, goods, and ideas for over a thousand years. The Chinese government must work to show that its vision of the modern Silk Roads is genuinely inclusive. Historically, these interconnections exhibited a wide range of cultural and political diversity, characterized by fluidity and mutual exchange, rather than hegemonic power relations.

In the 21st century, China’s approach to foreign trade and investment is ostensibly predicated on the principle of “non-interference” in other countries’ domestic affairs. Chinese investors’ lack of attention to domestic practices of development encourages violations of social and environmental standards, or unequal terms of trade like natural resources or extraterritorial concessions for financing. To the detriment of local populations. Chinese state discourses emphasize the “win-win” relations between China and other countries’ governments, neglecting to address the negative socio-economic and environmental consequences for the communities directly impacted by the projects.

In order to better understand how to mitigate avoidable damage done by infrastructure development projects along the Belt and Road, mapping out relevant Chinese government policies is crucial. High level BRI policy documents like the 2015 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” outline general objectives and aims, while relevant Chinese government ministries have published high-level policies and guidelines for foreign investment throughout the years. Examples of international regulations and plans include the Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation (2013) and The Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan (2017). However, overlapping mandates between government agencies (e.g. the National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce) over management of foreign aid and outbound investment leads to a lack of regulatory clarity. Though the Chinese government has released many administrative measures and guidelines aimed at improving the environmental sustainability and social accountability of overseas investments, most of these remain voluntary and legally non-binding.

In sum, at the policy level, more stringent laws from both China and host countries are necessary to ensure an environmentally and socially responsible Belt and Road Initiative. At the project level, more nuanced understanding and appreciation of cultural differences are also needed to avoid perpetuating exploitative relations between Chinese investors and local communities.
Keynote: How China’s Belt & Road Transforms Global Economy and Local Ecologies

In the age of intensifying climate change, given the scale of the Belt and Road Initiative, new investments in energy infrastructure must foster genuinely green and sustainable development. When considering the question of how to green the Belt and Road, it is necessary to consider how infrastructure investments create multi-dimensional ripple effects on the global environment. For instance, as demand for meat increases in China, forests are being cleared in Latin America for soybean production; similar stories exist for countless other resources. Improved transportation and industrial infrastructure accelerate natural resource extraction, while hydropower dams and coal power plants radically transform surrounding landscapes.

In terms of climate, the continued expansion of Chinese-developed coal-fired power plants around the world in 2017 paints a dire picture for global carbon emissions. According to recent reports,1 from 2001 to 2016, 80% of China’s new overseas investments were in fossil fuels, with more polluting, less efficient technologies used for a quarter of new coal-fired power plants. Domestic drivers push such less-than-sustainable investments along the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese authorities are confronted with the dilemma of waging a “war on pollution” in urban cities while supporting the continued economic viability of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which are directly involved in or heavily dependent on fossil fuel production.

However, there are many opportunities to push for a greener Belt and Road Initiative. To begin, the development of new renewable energy infrastructure presents opportunities for both solar diplomacy abroad and growth of China’s domestic renewable energy sector. In terms of regulations, China can also share its emissions reductions policies for ports, as well as strengthen green finance mechanisms for Belt and Road projects. Chinese environmental NGOs have played a critical role in both domestic and international policy advocacy, working with a variety of government and civil society actors to improve environmental standards and risk management.

Addressing the structural challenges of the Belt and Road requires filling in gaps in knowledge on how infrastructure investment impacts ripple outwards to affect not only ecosystems but economies as well. More scholarly work is needed in the following areas: 1) Chinese overseas investments’ ripple effects on global forests; 2) holistic and multi-dimensional tools for analyzing water and energy risks; and 3) mapping un-economical projects to highlight financial risks for both host countries and Chinese investors. The Chinese government must pay more attention to the impacts of SOEs on the global food, water, and energy nexus.

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1 https://www.ft.com/content/f965fa22-9be4-11e8-9702-5946b9ae86e6d
Sustainable Finance: The Politics of China’s Global Energy Development

Chinese overseas foreign direct investment (OFDI) has grown steadily since the announcement of China’s “go global” strategy in 2000. Commitments in Belt and Road investments currently amount to around eight times the Chinese financial sector’s OFDI flows, but concerns about the sustainability of such investments have also intensified. The Chinese government has released guidelines and policies to govern overseas investment, like the Guidance on Promoting a Green Belt and Road (2017), which encourages adherence to multiple regulatory frameworks, including Chinese and host country laws, as well as international conventions and best practices.

Ensuring the sustainability of development finance remains a challenge, especially since little information regarding Belt and Road project loans and contracts has been released. Critics point to China’s so-called “debt diplomacy” and general lack of transparency, arguing that investments in fossil fuels will pose grave environmental consequences from carbon lock-in or become economically stranded assets. Most investments in energy and transportation are still tied to highly polluting sectors like coal, oil and gas—failing to reflect countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement.\(^2\) Though private entities invest more in solar and wind, their investments remain proportionally minimal.

Motivation for BRI projects to alleviate domestic overcapacity and reinvigorate state-owned enterprises makes implementation of renewable energy and other green projects difficult. Domestic overcapacity afflicts dirty and clean energy sectors alike, but major state banks still have little incentive to invest in clean energy produced mainly by private companies, especially when coal continues to be largely subsidized. Civil society is pushing to shift Chinese investments towards renewables by highlighting the economic risks of fossil fuel investments.

Transparency and public participation are both crucial for building trust with local communities and curbing pollution impacts. China can apply lessons learned from domestic policy reforms, like more stringent financial risk assessments, along with publicly available social and environmental impact assessments, to its overseas investments. Such efforts could help reaffirm the financial viability of projects, given that delays due to disputes and damages often cost large sums.

A stronger branding effort, characterized by rigorous and clear standards for BRI-sanctioned projects and penalties for noncompliance, could also improve project performance—such a system may already be under consideration.\(^3\) Standards-based branding is especially important given that the BRI has become synonymous with China’s foreign policy and overseas footprint. Moreover, greater communication between Chinese government ministries, such as the Ministry of Finance which structures financial deals and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has a better sense for how to navigate the international sphere, could help address geopolitical risks.

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Greening Development? Chinese Capital and Ecosystem Impacts

What remains uncertain about the BRI is whether new infrastructure development projects will be able to meet rigorous standards—environmental and social—in order to effectively catalyze genuinely sustainable development. There are many dimensions of ecosystem impact planning that must be taken into account when rolling out the large-scale transportation and energy infrastructure projects that are included in the BRI, from the construction of highways and mega-dams in ecologically sensitive areas in the Amazon and Mekong River basins, to planning for risk mitigation in hazardous environments like the seismologically active Himalayas.

Roads and railways, key to the integration of regional trade networks along the BRI, represent the frontline of environmental impacts, where direct impacts like pollution and habitat fragmentation pose threats to sensitive ecosystems. Furthermore, the expansion of roads into previously inaccessible terrain often leads to a series of knock-on effects, including facilitating the easier extraction of natural resources and conversion of forests into farmland. The cumulative impacts that stem from commercial modes of production that are made possible by infrastructure, like plantations and mines, may prove to be more harmful to sustainable development efforts in the long term.

Hydropower projects cause large-scale landscape transformations that disrupt livelihoods and food security by radically altering the flow of river systems like the Mekong. In Cambodia, the Lower Sesan 2 dam project alone may lead to an estimated 9.2% reduction in fisheries production. Strategic environmental assessments and basin-wide planning are necessary to avoid the worst socio-ecological impacts of such development projects, especially when foreign investors are operating in unfamiliar terrain. Chinese corporations’ modes of operation were formulated in China, without local contexts and histories of different countries in mind, which often leads to conflicts and disputes.

When investing abroad, Chinese companies cannot afford to be ignorant of local realities, socio-political or environmental. In the Himalayas, development plans must take into account seismic fault line patterns and local communities’ histories in order to avoid development that impoverishes instead of improves. Given the dual nature of state-owned enterprises in China, which are both commercially and politically oriented, geopolitical incentives distort infrastructure planners’ objectives, leading to geologically risky ventures in seismically active areas in the Himalayas.

As the BRI is poised to radically transform diverse environments through infrastructure, it is imperative that developers—in China and host countries alike—make adequate space for socio-environmental considerations to prevent the worst excesses of development.
China in Asia: Developing Borderlands and Peripheries

China’s neighbors in Asia have a long history of interaction through both trade and war—yet from the era of imperial dynasties till the present day, as a regional power in both economic and military terms, China has always cast a long shadow over smaller nations in South and Southeast Asia. Media narratives often depict a kind of Chinese hegemony over such countries, but the reality of Chinese foreign investment on the ground is much more complex and contingent on political and historical factors.

The motivations of diverse actors, including Chinese central government leadership, state-owned enterprise management, host country political elite, local authorities, and private entrepreneurs, all come into play in the economic transitions that take place in borderlands of Asia. Border towns are experiencing an economic boom as the proximity to Chinese trade networks has spurred rapid changes in the management of land, labor, and resources. At the same time, the governments of countries like Laos, Nepal, and Myanmar are also keen to access Chinese financing for both infrastructure and agricultural development in their respective border regions.

In terms of greening the BRI, most Chinese state-owned enterprises operating overseas are experienced in conventional energy development like coal and hydropower, while host countries do not have the policy or incentive framework for clean energy development. As has been demonstrated by local communities in Myanmar, small-scale, off-grid energy systems also present an opportunity to electrify rural communities with low-carbon, low-impact power generation.

Agricultural investments also form a large part of Chinese overseas investment in Southeast Asia, such as in rubber plantations in Laos. Chinese investors are attempting to replicate the agricultural modernization of Yunnan in Laos and Myanmar, but the divergences in political contexts result in different kinds of consequences for land use management and local livelihoods. Local barriers on the ground also present stumbling blocks for Chinese investors.

In the Himalayas, which are regarded as the “third pole” of the world, Chinese capital is transforming previously remote mountain areas on the Sino-Nepalese border through hydropower development, road construction and disaster relief. Despite the environmental risks of building large infrastructure in earthquake-prone regions of Nepal, Chinese companies bring visions of future development to rural villagers in Nepal—the long-term impacts of these changes remain unclear, especially in an environmentally uncertain landscape like the Himalayan mountains.

The development of borderlands presents opportunities to leapfrog old models of development that were both ecologically and socially disruptive. Attention to the localized histories of particular places and alternative paths towards more equitable development would create space to envision and achieve genuinely “win-win” situations.
China in Africa: Myths of Neocolonialism or Globalization

Simplistic narratives of Chinese neocolonialism in Africa do not help us understand the processes that are actually happening on the ground. After a long history of Western imperialism and resource extraction, and lasting unequal relations of debt with Western nations, government leaders across Africa have welcomed Chinese investment. From the East African countries along the Indian Ocean to the Western and Central African countries facing the Atlantic, Chinese capital has financed infrastructure development and natural resource extraction projects.

One of the most iconic examples of Chinese infrastructure development in Africa is the new Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, but many more transportation corridors will be constructed across Africa in the coming years. Protecting diverse environments across the continent will require extensive coordination between national and local levels of the host governments and ministries and agencies in China, as well as Chinese state-owned banks and corporations—all of which must be held accountable. With business as usual, these large-scale infrastructure projects pose threats to conservation landscapes in Africa due to impending habitat loss, illegal wildlife extraction, and migratory impacts. As such, it is imperative that state and corporate actors work together with civil society to understand and mitigate environmental impacts.

Much of the appeal of Chinese development finance is derived from the “Chinese development model”—but in an age of increasing environmental insecurity, can this model still apply to other countries in the global South in the 21st century? Case studies from Guinea and Sierra Leone in 2017 reveal how Chinese state-owned enterprises’ mining operations have involved land grabbing, unfair compensation, and water pollution, negatively impacting people’s livelihoods and ways of life, particularly women. Development with “Chinese characteristics” has exhibited a lack of respect and consideration for local laws, culture and communities, combined with widespread corruption.

The sluggish development of Chinese-run special economic zones in Zambia, a country with a long history of foreign relations with China, brings up questions of how “China” is comprised of many actors with divergent agendas. Understanding the motivations of planners and developers can shed light on how to better organize production and development around principles of sustainability and equity. China is not the only investor in resource extraction or industrial development, but it is necessary to comprehend how specific plans and designs are realized on the ground, which requires understanding the diverse landscape of Chinese development actors.

It is important to note that the negative effects on environments and communities in Africa cannot be attributed solely to Chinese investment practices. Across Africa, countries like Gabon have had to wrestle with the institutional and structural legacies of colonialism, which had reordered society and landscapes towards resource extraction. The Chinese companies that arrive to harvest timber in such countries encounter complex, local histories of land use and customs, as well as local authorities and international organizations. Without recognizing the ways in which colonialism created structural inequalities in various African countries’ contexts, Chinese investments may end up replicating similarly exploitative relations between foreigners and locals.
China in Latin America: Between Extractives and Sustainability

Despite not yet being an official corridor of the “belt” and “road” routes, Latin America is a backbone of China’s “going global” strategy. Chinese investment in the region largely takes the form of sovereign loans and direct investments, mainly in Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú, Brazil and Argentina. Meanwhile, most countries in the region have signed hundreds of bilateral agreements, from Joint Action Plans to BRI Memorandums of Understanding. A good number of these agreements aim to facilitate the building of infrastructure, the extraction of natural resources, and the transportation of minerals, metals and soya.

For China, having contributed to modernizing important maritime nodes like the Panama Canal will help to increase trade and enhance transportation efficiency between China and Latin America. This, in addition to the continued demand from manufacturing sectors in light of China’s domestic environmental clean-up efforts, will increase the demand for natural resources that have fomented violence and environmental degradation in many parts of the region.

Infringements upon human rights and protected environments tend to be the most significant points of contention related to Chinese projects in Latin America. China’s relationship with Ecuador, where it is the largest lender and a major presence in key sectors such as hydropower, oil, and mining, illustrates the need for stronger standards, better due diligence and accountability toward on-the-ground performance of Chinese companies.

A prime example is the Coca Codo Sinclair (CCS) hydropower dam, financed by China Exim Bank and built by Sinohydro, is the largest infrastructure project ever built in the country. CCS was on the ‘shelves’ of the Ecuadorian National Planning Secretary for decades, until the China Exim Bank offered a loan to build it in 2009. Then, in record time, the project was declared a “national priority” and went ahead without updating the technical studies conducted in 1992. Not surprisingly, CCS has encountered major technical flaws and workflow miscalculations that are affecting its proper operation, and even worse, could risk damage to the structural integrity of the dam. At the end of 2018, the Ecuadorian government hired an auditing company to determine the extent of the problems, the cost of reparations, and the company’s responsibilities to address them.

Moreover, CCS was sold as the key part of a national strategy to clean the country’s energy matrix. However, Ecuador has had to expand oil drilling operations in the Amazon region, affecting two indigenous people’s groups and five protected areas, including Yasuní National Park—the most biodiverse place in the entire Amazon—in order to be able to pay back the Chinese loans with which the mega-dam was built.

Given the unique environmental characteristics and the presence of indigenous peoples in Latin America, more stringent safeguards for infrastructure investments are necessary to avoid further environmental, social, and economic damages. Energy development projects in the Amazon, especially hydropower, should still be evaluated critically and holistically against the needs of the country, their cumulative impacts and the perspectives of local communities—especially those who stand to bear the brunt of such impacts.
Conclusion

The Belt and Road Initiative represents a monumental shift in the geopolitical and economic structures that order the world. Whether China’s investments across the global South will lead to genuinely sustainable and equitable development will depend on how these infrastructure development plans are designed in ways that will facilitate environmentally and socially responsible progress. Climate change is already a reality that national governments and local communities alike cannot ignore. However, the people who stand to lose the most from worsening droughts and floods are typically those who have the least power to change systems of energy production and resource consumption.

In the face of intensifying climate change and enduring material poverty, governments and corporations must rise up to the challenge of constructing an alternative economic system. The BRI represents an opportunity for China and other countries’ governments to plan energy and transportation infrastructure in a way that adequately confronts the magnitude of climate change, such as investing in clean and renewable energy production. However, radical, transformative government action on climate change and green development must not sacrifice the well-being of certain peoples—often those that are not represented at the table. At the international and national level, development planners and corporations must consider the ripple effects of large-scale infrastructure on natural resource extraction and environmental pollution, in relation to food security and public health. At the project level, development actors must listen to and incorporate local voices and perspectives into planning, implementation, and monitoring.

Rising up to the challenges posed by climate change requires abandoning “business as usual” and developmental mindsets that precipitated the current global environmental crisis. In order to realize the Chinese government’s principles of a global “community of common destiny” characterized by mutual prosperity, China and other countries’ leaders, investors, and planners must recognize the myriad negative impacts to which conventional development models have given rise. Structural changes such as increased regulation of highly polluting industries, or even broader reconsiderations of extractive modes of economic production, will require humility on the part of the world’s political and economic elite. China’s and other countries’ leaders must open their eyes and ears to the experiences of indigenous and local communities on the frontlines of climate change and destructive development, to learn from history and chart a new path towards a more sustainable equitable future for all.
Resources

Below is a list of resources provided by Symposium speakers, as well as a non-exhaustive selection of additional resources pertinent to Chinese overseas investments and their environmental impacts.

Resources from Symposium Speakers

- **Paulina Garzon.** “Handbook on Environmental and Social Guidelines for Foreign Loans and Investments.” September 2018. [https://bankinformationcenter.cdn.prismic.io/bankinformationcenter/1844abb4-71ac-4f4d-a714-6a8ace64e757_english+handbook+on+chinese+e%26s+guidelines+classii+%281%29.pdf](https://bankinformationcenter.cdn.prismic.io/bankinformationcenter/1844abb4-71ac-4f4d-a714-6a8ace64e757_english+handbook+on+chinese+e%26s+guidelines+classii+%281%29.pdf)

Additional Resources

- **Inclusive Development International.** “Safeguarding People and the Environment in Chinese Investments.” [https://www.followingthemoney.org/chapters/chinesestandards/](https://www.followingthemoney.org/chapters/chinesestandards/)
- **Tianjie Ma, Calvin Quek** and **Tom Baxter.** Panda Paw Dragon Claw (Online Blog). [https://pandapawdragonclaw.blog/](https://pandapawdragonclaw.blog/)
- **MERICS. Belt and Road Tracker (Online Database).** [https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker](https://www.merics.org/en/bri-tracker)
Symposium Agenda

3rd Yale Symposium on Chinese Overseas Investment Impacts:
Greening the Belt and Road

Host: Yale University, School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
Date: January 25, 2019; 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
Location: Kroon Hall, 195 Prospect St, New Haven, CT 06511

Welcoming Remarks
- Mary Evelyn Tucker, Senior Lecturer and Senior Research Scholar, Yale University

Panel 1: The Belt & Road Initiative: History and Context
- Helen Siu, Professor of Anthropology, Yale University
- Jing Tsu, Professor of East Asian Languages and Literatures & Comparative Literature; Chair, Council on East Asian Studies, Yale University
- Jingjing Zhang, Yale World Fellow 2008; Lecturer in Law, Transnational Environmental Accountability Project, University of Maryland
Moderated by Mary Evelyn Tucker, Yale University

Keynote: How China Transforms Global Economy and Ecology
- Jennifer Turner, Director, China Environment Forum, Woodrow Wilson Center

Panel 2: Sustainable Finance: The Politics of China’s Global Energy Development
- Jamie P. Horsley, Visiting Lecturer and Senior Fellow in Law, Paul Tsai China Center, Yale University
- Xinyue Ma, China Researcher and Project Leader, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University
- Yiting Wang, Program Development Manager, World Wildlife Fund
Moderated by Jennifer Turner, Woodrow Wilson Center

Panel 3: Greening Development?: Chinese Capital and Ecosystem Impacts
- Brian Eyler, Director, Southeast Asia Program, Stimson Center
- Elizabeth Losos, Senior Fellow, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University
- Galen Murton, Assistant Professor of Geographic Science, Department of Integrated Science and Technology, James Madison University
Moderated by Paulina Garzón, China-Latin America Sustainable Investments Initiative, Bank Information Center
Breakout Sessions:

**China in Asia:** Developing Borderlands and Peripheries

- **Juliet Lu,** Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management, University of California - Berkeley
- **Tyler Harlan,** Postdoctoral Fellow in Sustainability, Atkinson Center for a Sustainable Future/Department of Development Sociology, Cornell University
- **Austin Lord,** Ph.D. Candidate, Cornell University, Department of Anthropology

Moderated by Brian Eyler, Stimson Center

**China in Africa:** Myths of Neocolonialism or Globalization

- **Helen Gichohi,** Associate Research Scholar and Dorothy S. McCluskey Fellow in Conservation; Conservation Ambassador for Africa, Fauna and Flora International
- **Dorothy Tang,** Adjunct Assistant Professor, The University of Hong Kong
- **Jingjing Zhang,** Fellow, Open Society Foundations
- **Wen Zhou,** Ph.D. Candidate, Yale University, Department of Anthropology and School of Forestry & Environmental Studies

Moderated by Vivian Lu, Yale University

**China in Latin America:** Between Extractives and Sustainability

- **Julie Klinger,** Assistant Professor of International Relations, Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University
- **Paulina Garzón,** Director, China Latin-America Sustainable Investments Initiative (CLASII), Bank Information Center

Moderated by Elizabeth Losos, Duke University

**Closing Session**

**Concluding Remarks**

- **Jing Tsu,** Professor of East Asian Languages and Literatures & Comparative Literature; Chair, Council on East Asian Studies, Yale University